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Abstract 
This appreciative inquiry of James Tartaglia’s Philosophy in a Meaningless Life examines the case 
Tartaglia makes for the meaninglessness of life itself (as opposed to particular purposeful activities 
within life), and asks whether it is still possible for modern persons to entertain a notion of meaning 
that does not stem from human purpose and decision alone. Does meaning only reside in the purposes 
humans choose and the activities they invent, or can human beings experience the enveloping universe 
as itself responsive to the human quest for meaning? Taking up the work of Victor Frankl, this essay 
explores the latter possibility, in sympathy with Tartaglia’s resistance to quick and easy impositions 
of all-too-human meaning on the transcendent context of life itself. 
 
 
I. Philosophical Pluralism and the Question of the Meaning of Life 
 
When the editors at the Journal of the Philosophy of Life invited me to 
contribute an essay to this special issue on James Tartaglia’s most recent book, I 
was both honoured and happy to accept. I had appreciated Tartaglia’s helpful and 
insightful commentary on Richard Rorty’s Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, 
and was curious to discover what sort of original philosophical contribution he 
would provide outside the format of a philosophical commentary.1 Then I opened 
the .pdf file that the editors at Bloomsbury sent me and was greeted by the 
ominous title, Philosophy in a Meaningless Life: A System of Nihilism, 
Consciousness, and Reality. Since I’m one of those increasingly rare intellectuals 
who naively yet somehow confidently assumes that life is meaningful, even if we 
humans cannot provide a general definition of such meaning or otherwise provide 
for it on our own terms, I prepared myself for the worst. Would I be treated to yet 
another tiresome version of ‘Ditchkinian’ physicalist reductionism, 
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paternalistically explaining to me that there is nothing but atoms and the void, and 
that any non-scientific discourse claiming to find meaning in human existence is 
nothing more than fanciful human projection? Or would I get the ‘accomplished’ 
Nietzschean version, in which we humans, mere floating specks in a vast universe 
that cares nothing for our existence, may connect to nothing more ultimate than 
our own will-to-power? 
Although Tartaglia’s version of nihilism more closely resembles the 
‘accomplished’ Nietzschean version, ultimately the book pursues neither of the 
aforementioned directions (while also appreciating and learning from them). 
Instead, he takes the reader on a whirlwind philosophical tour through which he 
lays out his own unique and highly interesting take on nihilism. Along the way, 
we are also treated to some first-rate and deeply rewarding philosophy of mind, 
including intriguing treatments of such themes as consciousness, time, universals, 
and transcendence. Through his exploration of these themes, Tartaglia seeks to 
convince his reader that the relative purposefulness we experience through the 
daily activities we pursue within the framework of ordinary life provides us with 
meaning enough, and the fact that we cannot specify an analogous purpose or 
meaning for life itself need not bother us very much.2 He even hints, toward the 
book’s end, that our inability to ascribe an overall meaning to life itself can in fact 
encourage an edifying form of spiritual comportment to the very fact of our 
existence, wherein our anxiety to impose meaning on life itself finally comes to 
be stilled (not answered), thereby providing a measure of existential comfort. 
But before jumping to the end of the book, I need to say more about the way 
in which Tartaglia argues for life’s meaninglessness. I will do so in the next 
section. After that, I will finally turn my attention to some of the spiritual concerns 
Tartaglia’s position raises for me, and indeed for himself (if the book’s conclusion 
is any indication). At this point, however, I would like to head off a potential 
misunderstanding: Simply because, as I described above, I consider myself to be 
an intellectual who somehow naively assumes life itself to have meaning, I would 
hate for anyone to conclude from this admission that my reaction to Tartaglia’s 
work must be fundamentally hostile, and that I therefore plan to engage in some 
form of more or less veiled polemics. To the contrary, I have struggled with 
Tartaglia’s position and have taken it seriously as a possible and defensible answer 
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to the big questions he asks. I have let his version of nihilism trouble my sleep. I 
have done so not simply to strengthen my position by exposing it to a strong 
contrast case, but also because, at the end of the day, I do not think that there exists 
any knock-down philosophical refutation of Tartaglia’s position, and I respect the 
intellectual honesty that has led him to it.3 
What I do spy in Tartaglia’s position concerning nihilism, however, is that he 
might not grant the same quarter to my spiritual position with respect to the 
question of life’s meaning (which I will reveal in due time), and would thus be 
less tolerant of a measure of philosophical pluralism when it comes to answering 
this question. Here I locate a productive tension between us that might help shed 
further light on the big questions that form the subject matter of this book. My 
hunch is that a greater tolerance of pluralism can open up dialogical space and a 
search for common understanding, if not common ground. Trying my level best 
to steer clear of polemic, then, I will take the opportunity this examination affords 
to consider ways in which the assumption of meaning to life itself could still look 
like a tenable position, even in modernity, in ways that perhaps Tartaglia has yet 
to consider fully or otherwise address. What I have found interesting and even 
surprising, given the difference between our positions, is the way that both of them 
eventuate in comparable (but of course not exactly similar) forms of attentive, if 
not receptive, spiritual comportment to human life in a world that transcends it. 
Of course, this spiritual resonance, however deep, still resides in the context of a 
difference that makes a difference. Nevertheless, I maintain that it presents real 
common ground upon which to continue a communal conversation. 
One final word of caution: In this brief examination, I will remain relatively 
silent on many of the book’s more fine-tuned arguments concerning the 
transcendence of human consciousness and self-aware experience from the 
objective or material world, the human consciousness of time, and the human 
ability to conceive the world in terms of universals. These are all fascinating 
discussions, and I’m still not sure that I have understood all the nuances of the 
arguments contained therein, and so I will leave it to others more capable than 
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myself to unpack them. Instead, I here take the risk of addressing my attention 
primarily to the beginning and end of the book, and so of neglecting somewhat 
the connecting parts in the middle. My justification for so doing, such as it is, is a 
felt need, as my discussion above already indicates, to take a high altitude view 
of Tartaglia’s project; for questions about what meaning itself is, and whether or 
not anything like it can be ascribed to life itself, are large ones, the biggest 
questions we can in fact ask. It is at this high-altitude level, then, that I begin to 
engage with Tartaglia’s project. 
 
II. Purposeless Life as the Framework for Relative Meaning 
 
As beings who ultimately pursue a meaningless life, humans are, to say the 
least, curious creatures. Together, over time and not without an enormous amount 
of violence and agonism, but also cooperation, we have developed cultures and 
civilizations that provide us with models for living together, roles to perform, and 
tasks to carry out. This feature of our existence provides us with goals and 
purposes, and these serve to provide relative meaning to the various and sundry 
activities we undertake to achieve them, as well as criteria by which to measure 
our success in so doing. In Tartaglia’s words, human culture and civilization thus 
provide everyday life with a “framework,” one that gives meaning to the activities 
that take place within it, and a sense of identity to those who perform them. 
“Within the framework … we can tread a more or less beaten path through our 
lives, and are thereby provided with rules and objectives for living. In this way, 
life takes on the character of a game: a highly flexible and complex game, of 
course, but nevertheless an activity we can join in with others, and perhaps at the 
end, look back to evaluate how well we did” (23).  
For humans, Tartaglia notes, this framework is not simply the framework of 
biological imperatives that we share with other animals. Our framework is more 
than simply biological because, unlike non-human animals, our lives are not 
constituted by biological imperatives alone. Whereas we would have good cause 
to ask what has gone wrong when an animal has stopped mating or eating for no 
discernible biological reason, we do not normally draw the same conclusion when 
a human being takes a vow of chastity or goes on a hunger strike (23). For 
Tartaglia, examples like this show us that human beings “have broken free of the 
biological framework in which their ancestors lived,” so much so that it is more 
accurate to describe the human framework as a “social framework” (23). Tartaglia 
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goes so far as to suggest that our biological imperatives have been socialized to 
the extent that even the imperative to satisfy our desire to eat, although not 
something we invented or gave to ourselves, “can only govern our behaviour if 
we choose to play along.” Following this line of thinking to its logical end, he 
concludes that our freedom “to put even biological imperatives aside serves as a 
reminder that for the modern human being, all purposes are socially constructed 
impositions upon life, rather than something constitutive of life” (23). 
The social framework we inhabit from day to day thus tells us some specific 
things about what is unique to the human form of life. For starters, when we 
consider the framework, we see that, unlike life itself, the activities and purposes 
that populate it are in some sense things that we ourselves have invented and 
chosen. While these activities and goals depend on the interpretation we give to 
them, life itself would continue to exist in the absence of such interpretation: 
“Once the interpretation is in place, activities have a purpose within life, just as 
chess moves have a purpose within the game, and the game has a purpose within 
life; but in all these cases the purpose is made up within a life that has no purpose 
of its own” (23). Life itself has no purpose because, as that which gives the 
framework in which we create all of our cultural inventions, it is something that 
we ourselves did not invent, and so it is something to which we could never 
ascribe, and upon which we could never impose, a purpose. 
For Tartaglia, all meaning is relative to the framework, and that which gives 
the framework, life, is meaningless itself. On this understanding, human meaning 
is intimately related to human making. This understanding of meaning allows 
Tartaglia to claim, as we saw above, that “all purposes are socially constructed 
impositions upon life, rather than something constitutive of life” (23). Whatever 
or whomever it is that constitutes life, it is not us. As alive, we find ourselves to 
be merely the recipients of life, albeit a unique form of life that has evolved the 
freedom to impose socially constructed purposes upon that which we did not 
ourselves constitute. These purposes, Tartaglia goes on to describe, “have been 
made up anonymously over the course of history, as people living together in 
communities, guided by evolving conceptions of what constitutes a good life and 
how best to achieve it, have established patterns of behaviour with criteria of 
success and failure” (23). We see the difference between life itself and the human 
form of life that is only able to impose relative meaning and purpose upon it, once 
we consider the fact that, even if we suspended all our culturally prescribed 
activities within the framework, life itself would not cease: “It would remain, its 
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pointlessness rendered more perspicuous” (23). 
One might wish to ask an epistemological question at this point, concerning 
how Tartaglia considers it possible for us to perform such a thought experiment 
in the first place. That is, how are we able to imagine the total suspension of 
everyday life practices, and thereby notice the way in which, in that situation, life 
itself would be seen to lack any point or purpose? In order for this thought 
experiment to succeed, would we not have to retain, rather than suspend, one last 
practice, i.e., the practice of judging the presence or absence of purposes? And 
wouldn’t the need to simultaneously retain and suspend that practice show the 
impossibility of ascribing either meaning or meaninglessness to life itself? My 
point is that, if any judgment concerning the meaning or meaninglessness of life 
itself can only come into view upon the suspension of all purposeful human 
practices, and yet the act of judging is part of the parcel of those practices to be 
suspended, then under such a requirement one would never be able to come to one 
conclusion or its opposite, because one would not be able to engage in the practice 
of judging. It seems rather facile to conclude that life itself refuses to answer a 
question that no one can ever ask (under the requirement of this thought 
experiment); in the absence of a prior question, or anyone who could ask it, how 
or why should life itself supply an answer? 
For now, however, we may put aside this epistemological quibble, for the 
inherent problems of Tartaglia’s counterfactual thought experiment do not really 
present insuperable obstacles to his overall program. That is, the weight of his 
thesis does not hang upon the thought experiment’s possibility, even if the way he 
poses it reveals some of his more important philosophical assumptions. The point 
he is really making is that we have no reason to believe that life itself would not 
continue if humans stopped being the free, socially constructive animals that we 
are. Counterfactually imagining a human witness to this situation, Tartaglia 
believes, renders the meaninglessness of life itself salient; by entertaining the 
absence or ceased existence of the activity of the meaning-giving creature—the 
socially-constituted human animal—one demonstrates the inaptness of searching 
for some ‘point to it all’, one akin to the relative purposefulness of everyday life. 
For, in this scenario, the purposefulness of ordinary life would no longer exist, 
and so could not be used to measure the meaning of life itself. 
Closer to the main thrust of his argument, Tartaglia thinks he can account 
positively, and not just negatively, for our ability to judge in favour of life’s overall 
meaninglessness, even in the midst of our purpose-filled, everyday lives. As it 
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turns out, humans are not just beings who exist within the everyday framework, 
but also beings who are able to transcend and thus suspend this framework in 
various ways. In moments of reflection, for example, we are able to look 
objectively at life as a whole. In thought, we are able to suspend our engagement 
with the framework, an ability, Tartaglia explains, we have evolved “to suspend 
engagement with one way of life in favour of another” (25). Unlike other animals, 
Tartaglia says, humans have evolved a degree of freedom with respect to their 
situation, through which they can choose which paths to follow in life, even 
changing them midcourse. As Bruce Springsteen reminds us, you can have a wife 
and kids in Baltimore, Jack, and then one day simply decide to go out for a ride 
and never go back. For Tartaglia, our freedom to make such shifts, to suspend 
engagement with one way of life in favour of another, demonstrates our ability to 
suspend framework engagement as such. 
This significant feature of human existence, our evolved freedom to transcend 
the framework and reflect upon it, naturally leads us to entertain questions 
concerning the meaning of life itself, the point or goal of the entire framework as 
such, and not just the meaning of the various activities we pursue together within 
it. Equally naturally, we are tempted to think that the meaning of life itself must 
be something analogous to the meaning of our goal-oriented activities within the 
framework it provides. Just as these latter have a point that gives them meaning, 
so must the former. Yet when we transcend the framework, he says, we neither 
discover nor discern any overall purpose to life itself, one that would give it 
meaning in the same way that, say, nourishing our bodies gives the activities of 
farming, hunting, and eating meaning: “[O]ur collective movements have created 
the context in which individual movements are understood as meaningful, but 
there is no wider context in which life itself can be understood as meaningful” 
(25). 
In order for us to attribute meaning to that which gives the framework, life 
itself, we must not only be able to transcend the framework, but also discern 
features of this new meta-context that would give it overall meaning. That is, this 
meta-context could not be any old context, but must rather be a context of 
meaning. “The idea of a further context of meaning beyond the framework, then, 
is the idea that life itself might be placed in a context of meaning; and if there 
were such a context, this might provide our various activities within life with a 
further significance” (48). Tartaglia argues, however, that any sort of meaning 
analogous to the kind we ascribe to activities within the framework is precisely 
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what this meta-context itself lacks (49), because we have no good reason to 
believe that it is itself a context of meaning. We know that the framework rests 
within the context of the physical universe, for example, but it is a leap beyond 
the available facts to presume that this context is a context of meaning, or that the 
physical universe itself is nestled within a further transcendent context of meaning 
(50). 
While Tartaglia admits that we have no grounds to rule out the existence of 
such a transcendent context of meaning—because, he says, “we have no grounds 
to suppose that only meaningless existence could provide the final context of 
existence”—he nevertheless argues that “we have no good reason to believe in it 
either” (52). While we cannot rule out the possibility of the existence of such a 
context, there is nothing we can do to establish that possibility either. “All this is 
possible, but possibility is cheap” (52). The real significance of the very notion of 
a transcendent hypothesis of meaning, Tartaglia says, is not the challenge it 
presents to nihilism, “but rather that it provides us with an idea of what would be 
required for nihilism to be false; an idea which is deeply rooted in our intellectual 
history, which is made tangible by our experience, and which people might 
understandably want to be true” (53). Wishful thinking, however, is no basis upon 
which to insist on as dubious a posit as the existence of a transcendent context of 
meaning. 
Yet even if we cannot in good intellectual conscience affirm the existence of 
such a context, we still need to come to terms with our ability to transcend the 
framework and view it as a whole (and thus entertain the question of the meaning 
of that whole). Precisely because of this ability, Tartaglia sees the emergence of 
two other features of everyday existence that bear witness to the meaninglessness 
of life itself. In particular, he points to what he describes, in Heideggerian fashion, 
as the “attunements” of anxiety and boredom. He describes these as attunements, 
rather than simply as moods, “because they are not responses to particular and 
changeable circumstances, but rather the human condition as a whole” (26). Pace 
Heidegger, Tartaglia maintains that both anxiety and boredom attest to the truth 
of nihilism, because they are attunements we naturally fall into once we transcend 
and thus suspend our ongoing activity within the framework. Both attunements 
are “appropriate responses to an existence which requires action because it is 
temporal, but does not require any particular action because it is meaningless” 
(26). Our freedom to transcend the framework and view all the moves within it as 
somehow optional is akin to our freedom to suspend the rules of a game like chess. 
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The moment we realize that nothing more ultimate than the conventionally 
interpreted rules of the game prevents us from moving the pieces in any direction 
or not at all, an infinite array of possibilities starts to loom. Our first response to 
such looming infinite possibility is anxiety—for, in the absence of any 
conventional rules, how shall we decide which to pursue? Finally this anxiety 
subsides into boredom, as the realization finally sinks in that it would be 
ultimately pointless to pursue any at all. Whether through reflection, anxiety, or 
boredom, then, our ability to transcend and suspend framework activity ultimately 
discloses the meaninglessness of life itself: “When we disengage in this way, 
either deliberately for the purposes of philosophy, or passively when we fall into 
anxiety or boredom, then previously unquestioned and all-consuming goals 
emerge in a new light: as optional and ultimately pointless” (27). 
I pause here to ask whether anxiety and boredom are the only human 
attunements with a significant bearing on the question of the meaning of life, or 
if Tartaglia emphasizes them to the exclusion of others because of the privileged 
relationship they have to the nihilistic answer to this question. Are there other 
attunements, maybe even competing or contrasting ones, that would render the 
question less decidable and more ambivalent? I wonder, to take a few examples, 
where Tartaglia would place joy, wonder, or gratitude? Like anxiety and boredom, 
these too would seem to qualify as attunements on his definition, insofar as “they 
are not responses to particular and changeable circumstances, but rather the 
human condition as a whole” (26). Since we are in Heideggerian territory here, I 
might point out that in section II of Being and Time, in his discussion of 
“anticipatory resoluteness,” Heidegger draws attention to joy as a “fundamental 
mood” that accompanies angst: “Together with the sober Angst that brings us 
before our individualized potentiality-of-being, goes the unshakable joy in this 
possibility. In it Da-sein becomes free of the entertaining ‘incidentals’ that busy 
curiosity provides for itself, primarily in terms of the events of the world.”4 I 
mention Heidegger here not because he is an unassailable authority on this 
subject, but because Tartaglia seems to agree with him that our attunements are 
more than just subjective projections, but instead reveal something about our 
ontological situation, our being in relation to the world that surrounds and solicits 
us (even if the solicitation is more obvious in Heidegger’s case than in Tartaglia’s). 
Unlike Heidegger, however, Tartaglia thinks these attunements reveal only 
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ultimate meaninglessness, and he thus refrains from locating ultimate meaning in 
anything at all, let alone something akin to Dasein’s authentic seizing of 
possibility through its resolute being-towards-death. 5  The question remains, 
however, whether anxiety and boredom are the only possible “tunings” of our 
situation, or if there are other tunings just as legitimate that disclose different 
aspects of our ontological situation. 
Focusing on the attuning clues of anxiety and boredom exclusively, Tartaglia 
purports to discover meaninglessness as a kind of empirical fact. He thus frames 
his position as a kind of neutral discovery (one whose ramifications, moreover, 
are far from being as dire as philosophers and others have traditionally feared). In 
order to arrive here, he realizes that he can only follow Heidegger so far, and must 
eventually reject key features of the latter’s existential analytic of Dasein. The 
reason he must reject these features is because his position does not allow him to 
claim the same ontological significance for our everyday absorption in our 
projects as Heidegger does. Heidegger invests great significance in the fact that 
from the very first we find ourselves in a world where things matter for us or 
concern us. Although Heidegger argues that attunements like anxiety allow us to 
awaken from a sort of fallen absorption in the framework, from our routine 
adherence to the roles and assignments that have already been carved out and 
interpreted for us, so that we may eventually come to recognize and seize the 
possibility of choosing our own life projects, he still maintains that this awakening 
always (already) takes place within our careful and concernful being-in-the-
world. While we may work upon and alter our everyday absorption, we never 
really transcend or escape it. For Tartaglia, on the other hand, the break from our 
absorption in the framework he describes is more radical. He ultimately rejects 
Heidegger’s view that, although we can fall back from our engagements with the 
world, these engagements remain constitutive of our being. Instead, he insists that 
“falling back from our engagements—by viewing life as the ultimately pointless 
activity of bodies moving around and making noises—allows us to grasp 
something fundamental about our situation” (29). Tartaglia sees no reason to 
recognize anything more significant than temporal priority in the fact that 
existential absorption precedes philosophical reflection. What matters for him, 
rather, is the accomplishment that detached reflection represents. In thought, says 
Tartaglia, we have developed the ability to escape from the involved 
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understanding that Heidegger thinks we never truly escape, and this allows us to 
“look at our lives in detachment from the significance they normally have for us” 
(29). 
Of course, as Tartaglia himself recognizes, Heidegger would conclude that 
Tartaglia’s interpretation of our ability to fall back from our framework 
engagement smacks far too much of Cartesian detachment, and thus significantly 
misinterprets our being-in-the-world. Firmly grasping this horn of the dilemma, 
Tartaglia responds that the Heideggerian prioritization of existential absorption 
over reflective detachment fails to register the significance of the scientific 
worldview that modern humans have achieved: “[A]lthough we spend most of our 
waking lives in concerned engagement with the world, withdrawing from these 
engagements has produced a scientific worldview capable of explaining many of 
the features of them, as well as many other features of reality that have nothing to 
do with human engagement; and it is hard to see why temporal priority should be 
thought to take precedence over explanatory power” (30). Because “objective, 
scientific thinking provides a more comprehensive vocabulary for describing the 
world than the kind of understanding we have when engaged in the framework” 
(30), we have reason to take it seriously as indicating an answer to the question of 
the meaning of life itself, and thereby to question the derivative status to which 
Heidegger consigns it. By discovering and explaining “features of reality that 
have nothing to do with human engagement,” the scientific worldview “allows us 
to view our lives within a wider, physical context from which we are able to see 
that there is no overall point to our activities” (30). When it comes to determining 
criteria for what makes a context ultimate, the wider and more impersonal the 
better, Tartaglia thinks, even if interpreting ultimacy in this way forces us to 
relativize the only context we know that, according to Tartaglia, is capable of 
providing life with any meaning at all. 
With this all too brief summary of Tartaglia’s case for nihilism in hand, but 
with its rough contours in place, I now turn to some of the spiritual concerns it 
raises. In the next section, I will appeal to an extraordinarily influential modern 
treatment of the question of the meaning of life itself, Victor Frankl’s Man’s 
Search for Meaning.6 My intention in turning to this famous little book is not to 
produce some sort of philosophical trump card, but rather to see how Frankl’s 
alternative posture both compares to and resonates with Tartaglia’s nihilism. The 
                                                     
6 Victor E. Frankl, Man’s Search for Meaning: An Introduction to Logotherapy, trans. Ilse Lasch 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1962). 
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comparison, it turns out, is highly illuminating, and even surprising in some ways. 
My destination will finally be Tartaglia’s own admission, near the book’s end, that 
embracing nihilism need not relegate us to a lonely and comfortless existence, 
devoid of any and all spiritual sense or answer to human spiritual longing. This 
admission comes as a sort of culmination to his struggle to come to terms with 
what he takes to be the legitimate and necessary question of the meaning of life, 
including the need to face the likelihood of a negative answer squarely, while 
refusing any wishful consolation from the various speculative traditions of 
religion and philosophy along the way. The manner in which Tartaglia articulates 
the residual spiritual sense of nihilism portrays far more than it explicitly says, 
and it is in the space of this ‘more’, finally, that I think Tartaglia’s position 
discloses a modicum of spiritual solidarity with certain positions, like Frankl’s, 
that offer the opposite answer to our shared question. 
 
III. Spiritual Attunement and the Scientific Worldview 
 
As he builds his case for the meaninglessness of life itself, Tartaglia never 
doubts the legitimacy of the question. His project is not to answer the question of 
the meaninglessness of life, but rather to answer the question of the meaning of 
life, and the answer he purports to discover is that it has none. Although his 
negative answer to this question, that life itself has no meaning, point, or purpose, 
might tempt one to think he takes the question lightly, his respect for the question 
itself is on every page of the book. Because our framework-transcendence makes 
the question unavoidable, he recognizes the significance of the longstanding 
traditions of religion and philosophy that have attempted to address it (55). We 
moderns have come a long way, however, and with the ascendance of the scientific 
worldview we have finally come to see that the context that transcends the 
framework, the physical universe, is not a context of meaning, not a context that 
can provide any point or purpose to life in general or as a whole. 
But do we really know that the context we enter when we transcend our 
framework is only a “physical” universe, one that does not give any meaning to 
life itself? Surely it is also physical, but why is it only physical? Tartaglia spends 
two chapters in the book explaining how it is that human beings are not only 
physical, and that our conscious awareness of our experience cannot be reduced 
to brain states or some other material level (see chapters 4 and 5). Yet, because 
“everything we know about on the basis of experience exists within the physical 
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universe,” and because the physical universe, as physical, fails to provide a 
context of meaning, the possibility of a wider context of meaning, he says, “might 
seem to be nothing more than an abstract possibility arrived at by a process of 
reasoning about what would be required if life were to have meaning” (50). And 
as it turns out, Tartaglia suggests, this is just how we have in fact arrived at the 
conviction that life is meaningful: because we thought it must be. Because we 
mistakenly considered such general meaning to be a necessary requirement of a 
tenable life, we assumed that such meaning must be there for us to discover. 
Speculative traditions of religion and philosophy have arisen and passed away, all 
to meet this demand. But the entire time prior to the rise of the scientific 
worldview, we had not yet developed the intellectual chops that now allow us to 
recognize that the physical universe is silent, especially where the question of the 
meaning of life is concerned. 
Hearing only silence in response to his question, Tartaglia interprets its answer 
to be a resounding “no.” He would likely not put the matter this way. For him, 
when we look for a meaning to life itself, we simply don’t find one, and that puts 
the question to rest. Life itself is meaningless. But I still think this conclusion is 
an interpretive gesture, and not simply the neutral registering of simple fact, and 
that is why I would insist that, even if it is true that the transcending universe or 
cosmos responds only silently to our question, no answer is not the same thing as 
the definitive answer “no.” To be sure, neither is it compatible with a definitive 
“yes.” Rather, I would construe the silence as a space we enter with our question, 
one in which we must tarry and listen, resisting any immediate and easy answers 
of either the “yes” or “no” variety. This space has perhaps what Heidegger calls a 
“resonance of silence” (Gelaut der Stille)7. I’m not sure if Tartaglia would be 
friendly to this suggestion, or if he would think affirming it leaves us in far too 
vague and mystical a place, so perhaps I can fill it in with greater definition, and 
for this I wish to turn to Frankl. 
Frankl is an important historical witness to the human search for meaning 
because his reflections are borne in the crucible of unspeakable human suffering, 
a crucible in which one has been stripped of all framework engagements, not 
though free choice but through the external imposition of violent force. Surely 
this particular form of framework suspension would, as much or more than any 
other, put one in a position to reflect on the whole, the framework as such, life 
                                                     
7 Martin Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought (New York: HarperCollins, 2001), 207. 
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itself. Anyone asking the question of the meaning of life, then, cannot afford to 
ignore Frankl’s witness; because, unless one has suffered this intensely (and 
thankfully not all of us have), one would, without such witness, be utterly unable 
to access the perspective, indeed the spiritual orientation, it affords.8 Now, I 
would not to be misunderstood: many of those who survived this crucible or others 
akin to it have come away with a different answer to our question than Frankl has. 
I do not wish to gainsay the interpretation they have taken from their experience, 
or even their inability to make any sense of it at all. Indeed, at the end of the day, 
there is a profoundly inescapable senselessness to this kind of suffering, and—
again—quick and easy attempts to stitch meaning from it are bound to fail. We 
must resist the temptation to do so. 
At the same time, none of these worries robs Frankl’s own reflections and 
perspective of their peculiar legitimacy either. Yet beyond merely pointing to his 
example as one that portrays the possibility of ascribing meaning to life itself in 
ways that Tartaglia might yet be moved to consider, Frankl’s attempt is 
particularly apt for this discussion because of its own refusal to provide a quick 
and easy answer to the question, of the variety that Tartaglia say will never be 
forthcoming: “Long ago,” Frankl tells his reader, “we had passed the stage of 
asking what was the meaning of life, a naive query which understands life as the 
attaining of some aim through the active creation of something of value.” 9 
Whatever meaning can be found here in this crucible of suffering, Frankl attests, 
must be different in kind than the sort of point and purpose that gives framework 
activities their meaning, and those who perform them their identity. 
Frankl ultimately bears witness to a meaning disclosed in suffering (and, 
importantly, not the meaning of suffering, i.e., a meaning that would somehow 
justify its cruelty and uselessness). But in order to entertain the possibility of such 
meaning, one needs to adopt a paradigmatically different philosophical 
anthropology than the one Tartaglia assumes, wherein human beings are not the 
only and final meaning makers, beings who, as such, are unable to receive 
meaning from that which they did not themselves make (from sources like the 
physical universe, or life itself). But Frankl bears witness to just this possibility: 
                                                     
8 I owe this insight to Joseph Kirby, a Ph.D. candidate at the Institute for Christian Studies now under 
my supervision. I expect his forthcoming dissertation, On the Origins of Nihilism and the Rhetoric of 
Moral Ontology, to make a signal contribution to the very discussion about life’s meaning that 
Tartaglia addresses in this book, and my own thoughts on this matter have benefitted greatly from his 
insights. 
9 Frankl, Man’s Search for Meaning: An Introduction to Logotherapy, 78. 
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Selected by the Nazis to perform punishing forced labour under conditions of 
extreme malnourishment, he nonetheless found it in himself to reflect on his 
severely depleted condition, and wonder if any meaning could be found in it. His 
answer is rather stunning, especially to one who has not endured this level of 
suffering: “I was struggling to find the reason for my sufferings, my slow dying. 
In a last violent protest against the hopelessness of imminent death, I sensed my 
spirit piercing through the enveloping gloom. I felt it transcend that hopeless, 
meaningless world, and from somewhere I heard a victorious ‘Yes’ in answer to 
my question of the existence of an ultimate purpose.”10 
Now, perhaps I have here jumped too quickly to Frankl’s ‘yes’, but it is really 
the way in which he interprets that ‘yes’ that is important for the comparison I 
would here make between it and Tartaglia’s ‘no’. The quickest shorthand for me 
to use to get at this comparison is to highlight a difference between ‘what’ and 
‘that’ when it comes to how we think about the possibility of answering our 
question. That is, both Frankl and Tartaglia could likely agree that the ‘what’ 
question has no answer, at least not a general one applicable to everybody. But 
just because no everlasting or universally applicable answer to the question “what 
is the meaning of life” is forthcoming (such as The Hitchhiker’s Guide to the 
Galaxy’s famously hilarious “42”), does not preclude us from asserting that it has 
meaning or is meaningful itself in some way unrelated to our imposition of ends, 
points, purposes. “[F]rom somewhere I heard a victorious ‘yes’,” Frankl tells us, 
intimating that this answer is not something wishfully and willfully imposed on 
reality, but instead a message that came to him from beyond the darkness of his 
miserable situation. He proceeds to tell us that this missive came in several forms: 
a light comes on in a distant farmhouse, piercing the grey gloom; his wife from 
whom he had been long separated, and who has likely already died, becomes 
palpably present to him; and finally, at that very moment, he tells us, “a bird flew 
down silently and perched just in front of me, on the heap of soil which I had dug 
up from the ditch, and looked steadfastly at me.”11 Now, it could be that we 
moderns are no longer capable, or find it increasingly difficult, to be moved by 
this form of witness. Or, alternatively, this kind of witness could amount to little 
more than a highly sophisticated form of projection or wishful thinking. Even 
though I reject the latter conclusion, I cannot rule it out as demonstrably false. But 
                                                     
10 Ibid., 39. 
11 Ibid., 40. Again, I thank Joseph Kirby for impressing upon me the importance of the what/that 
distinction for this discussion. 
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at the very least Frankl’s witness portrays a different relationship with the 
surrounding physical universe than the one that the scientific worldview discloses. 
His surroundings speak to him in surprising and compassionate ways.12 
The difference I am trying to indicate here is the difference between thinking 
of the enveloping universe as something that somehow speaks to us, whether to 
issue a summons or to provide comfort and strength in the midst of suffering, or 
thinking of it as something that is mute and purposeless, because immune to our 
projections (however sympathetically one might interpret those). Tartaglia tells us 
that “some human desires—especially those for eternal life and universal 
justice—cannot be satisfied within our lives; whatever may happen in the future.” 
Because of this limitation, he says, we turn to “a transcendent hypothesis of 
meaning” which, in offering up the prospect of securing a meaning for life 
“satisfies these desires already.” Because these desires are eminently worthwhile 
in and of themselves, the transcendent hypothesis of meaning that would secure 
them, he tells us, “is an idea worthy of faith” (53). 
But for Tartaglia a transcendent hypothesis of meaning, such as the one Frankl 
claims to access, is not an idea worthy of reason, because when we follow our 
own rational lights beyond the everyday framework, we find nothing even closely 
resembling it. “Things make teleological sense only within life, and causal sense 
only within reality. Reality itself, however, makes neither teleological nor causal 
sense, for there is no purpose to it, and we cannot explain why it is here” (36). 
Tartaglia’s deeper spiritual position here seems to be, however, that there is no 
purpose to reality, or life itself, because we cannot explain why it is here. We 
cannot locate a purpose for it in the same way we can for our daily framework 
activities. If we could explain it in this way, if we free makers could impose a 
point or purpose upon something we ourselves have not made, then and only then 
would life itself yield an affirmative answer to our question. But then we need to 
ask, would such an answer really be one that comes from life itself? If we decide 
that the only meaning available to us is of this self-imposed variety, then we have 
already chosen to relate to the universe that surrounds and transcends us in a way 
that by definition precludes it from having any kind of voice or summons that 
could speak into our question. 
While Tartaglia marshals reasons to support an argument that would deny that 
                                                     
12 Here I have in mind something like Martin Buber’s distinction between relating to a given entity in 
the world as either an ‘it’ or as a ‘you’. See Martin Buber, I and Thou (Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1970), 
58, 173. 
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the enveloping context possesses such a voice, his decision to do so also bears 
trademarks of its own leaps of faith. For there is something about the scientific 
worldview he trumpets (as opposed to everyday interdisciplinary, institutional, 
and communal scientific practice) that requires the enveloping physical world to 
be silent and purposeless. In its more ideological and strident forms, this 
worldview requires the enveloping cosmos to be infinitely pliant and manipulable. 
Reality must not talk back to us or otherwise resist our instrumental interventions. 
Because this is the world the scientific worldview needs, it is the world that it 
finds. It is the world discovered by a being who has already decided that it is the 
only maker of meaning, and so it is free to impose any purpose upon life it chooses 
(even if not upon life itself, which I will get to later). This cluster of 
anthropological and cosmological assumptions, while of course not completely 
lacking in rational support, are far from being rationally demonstrated either. As 
such, the worldview composed from them is just as much an article of faith as is 
the religious assumption that the context that transcends the framework is one that 
speaks to us as a partner in dialogue. Both positions are rooted in faith, finally, 
because no one, per impossibile, is in the epistemological position to describe how 
the world is anyway, and science, in its multiplicity of forms, just as much as 
religion, in its multiplicity of forms, is an answer to a question that we ourselves 
have asked. Try as we might, we cannot erase ourselves from the equation.13 
Now, there can be no doubt that, to a great extent at least, we become who we 
say we are. But, should we decide to spiritually attune ourselves to the context 
that transcends our everyday framework, a possibility Tartaglia gestures toward 
at the end of the book, we may yet receive a message that might give moderns 
like us pause to consider if we should not in fact try to become something other 
than who we now find ourselves or think ourselves to be. Tartaglia’s insistence 
that life itself is not of our making, and so finally resistant to human-imposed 
meaning, carves out its own kind of spiritual space, one that he says promises to 
transform our willful relationship to our surrounding context. The pursuit of 
philosophy itself brings him to this space: 
 
                                                     
13 Here I am in fundamental agreement with Hannah Arendt, who in the essay “The Concept of 
History: Ancient and Modern” offers the following interpretation: “[T]he answers of science will 
always remain replies to questions asked by men; the confusion in the issue of ‘objectivity’ was to 
assume that there could be answers without questions and results independent of the question-asking 
being” See Hannah Arendt, Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought (Penguin, 
2006), 49. 
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On occasion … the ideas come alive, and I find myself realizing once more 
that my life belongs to a transcendent reality which serves no overall 
purpose, and which I cannot and should not hope to make any more than 
minimal sense of. Many kinds of philosophical reflection can get you to 
this place, and when you arrive everything takes on a new significance; this 
is the most sense I can make of the idea of spirituality. (184) 
 
There is, indeed, something very spiritually edifying about Tartaglia’s stated 
refusal to impose human-made meanings on life itself; for there is something 
deeply terrifying about those who presume to have secured the meaning of life 
itself in precisely these self-imposed terms—those who think the search is over 
and they have it all figured out. Tartaglia’s position, that when we search for this 
kind of meaning to life itself we find none, has the spiritual benefit of encouraging 
us to cease imposing our finite human meanings on that which we have not made, 
on a world that transcends us. It encourages us to assume an attentive form of 
spiritual comportment that suspends this feverish activity, and instead puts us in a 
receptive posture. 
Would it be too far of a stretch to say that this attentiveness or wakefulness 
journeys awhile alongside the form of spiritual comportment that Frankl urged his 
fellow prisoners to adopt? According to Frankl, the only hope for those 
“despairing men” whose inner lights were in danger of becoming extinguished 
under the pressure of a world that no longer recognized the value of human life 
was to somehow retain their sense of being an individual, “a being with a mind, 
with inner freedom and personal value.”14 To prevent this slide into personal 
oblivion, which was always closely followed by physical oblivion, one had to stop 
asking about the meaning of life: 
 
We had to learn ourselves and, furthermore, we had to teach the despairing 
men, that it did not really matter what we expected from life, but rather 
what life expected from us. We needed to stop asking about the meaning of 
life, and instead to think of ourselves as those who were being questioned 
by life—daily and hourly. Our answer must consist, not in talk and 
meditation, but in right action and in right conduct. Life ultimately means 
taking the responsibility to find the right answer to its problems and to 
                                                     
14 Frankl, Man’s Search for Meaning: An Introduction to Logotherapy, 49. 
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fulfill the tasks which it constantly sets for each individual.15 
 
While Tartaglia might agree with Frankl that we need to stop asking about the 
meaning of life, stop looking for a kind of self-imposed purpose or point to it, I 
still doubt, given everything he has said, whether he would embrace Frankl’s 
further conviction that we must refrain from such hasty meaning imposition in 
order to put ourselves into the sort of receptive posture whereby we can once again 
become beings who are and can be questioned by life. 
So, in spite of some common ground we seem to have arrived at an impasse. 
For Frankl, it is imperative that we are not the only meaning makers in the 
universe: “If the meaning which is waiting to be fulfilled by man were really 
nothing but a mere expression of self, or no more than a projection of his wishful 
thinking, it would immediately lose its demanding and challenging character; it 
could no longer call man forth or summon him” (100). Perhaps Frankl’s spiritual 
posture in these and other passages ultimately amounts to just that, another form 
of wishful thinking, and life ultimately demands nothing from us. Perhaps we only 
want to think it does because such a summons would provide an underpinning for 
the kind of moral sense that Frankl suggests is so vital for us to maintain if we are 
to remain human. Perhaps that sense is finally only a sophisticated projection upon 
a physical universe that has no reason for existing and doesn’t care that we are 
here. I have no philosophical arguments at my disposal that could disprove any of 
these conclusions (which is not to say that I am unable to marshal any reasons to 
doubt them). Tartaglia leaves his reader enough space to wonder, however, 
whether or not his practice of philosophy as a kind of spiritual exercise has 
brought him right up to the threshold of the very space in which a human being 
might once again become open to receiving a meaning that he did not simply 
construct or impose. 
 
 
  
                                                     
15 Ibid., 77. 
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